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NOTE
PROTECTING PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
UNDER THE DERIVATIVE WORKS
EXCEPTION*
Typically, songwriters transfer the copyright ownership rights in
their songs to music publishers. As copyright holder, a publisher
will collect the generated royalties and distribute the income to the
songwriter pursuant to the terms of the transfer. When a songwriter
exercises his statutory right to terminate a transfer of the copyright
in his original composition, all the copyright ownership rights revert
to the songwriter. 1 Included in this general reversion are the rights
to collect performance royalties and to license others to create de-
rivative works based on the original composition.2
One of the ways a publisher may choose to utilize a song is by
licensing record companies to develop derivative works. With re-
spect to a musical composition, a derivative work will most often be
a sound recording. With few exceptions, sound recordings of musi-
cal compositions are derivative works based on the underlying orig-
inal composition.3 A derivative work based on a musical
composition will most often be a sound recording. A sound record-
ing is the particular rendition of the composition reduced to a fixed
form such as a master tape.4 Sound recordings may be developed
only pursuant to a license.s To exploit a sound recording without
obtaining a license would constitute infringement. 6 When sound re-
cordings are publicly performed, such as radio or television broad-
cast, the underlying song generates performance royalties which
are the exclusive province of the copyright holder of the underlying
song.
7
This Note addresses a problem that arises when a publisher, as
copyright holder, has issued licenses to third parties, such as record
* The topic of this Note was inspired by an issue presented in the 1991
Cardozo/BMI Moot Court Competition.
1. The termination and reversion rights at issue in this Note apply to works
copyrighted prior to January 1, 1978, as provided in section 304(c) of The 1976
Copyright Act. See infra notes 9, 62-68 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
3. An exception would be where the sound recording is the first fixation of the
composition; i.e., no lead sheet or other written or aural fixation of the composition.
4. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
6. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 115(b)(2), (c)(5) (1988).
7. The right to performance royalties is the most valuable part of copyright
ownership. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Communications, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859, 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), amended and modified, 678 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See
infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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companies, to develop derivative works based on a copyrighted
composition. Specifically, if a publisher is collecting performance
royalties generated by the broadcast of derivative works he has li-
censed, may he continue to collect performance royalties for the
broadcasts of those derivative works once the author exercises his
statutory right to terminate the grant to the publisher and reacquire
the rights in the composition?
The relevant United States Supreme Court decision interpreting
the applicable statutory provision does not address the issue of per-
formance royalties.8 If read broadly, however, the Court's reason-
ing implies that the publisher's right to performance royalties
generated by pre-termination sound recordings survives termina-
tion. This Note argues that the assignment of the performance right
does not survive termination; the right to performance royalties is
among the rights that should revert to the writer. I say "should" be-
cause it is a close question. Music publishers facing termination of
their ownership interests in pre-1978 compositions9 would test this
issue by making a demand on their performing rights society
affiliate.
Part I of this Note provides a background summary of the law gov-
erning this issue. Part II discusses the relevant Supreme Court pre-
cedent, Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder.10 Part I argues that the
performance right is not protected by the Derivative Works Excep-
tion' 1 despite language in the Mi~ls Music decision that implies that
the right would survive termination. This Note concludes that with
respect to a musical composition, the performance right stems solely
from copyright ownership of the original composition; therefore, the
Derivative Works Exception may not be read to protect the perform-
ance right from reversion to the writer.
8. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) (5-4 decision) (Ste-
vens, J.). The Mills Music decision is discussed fully later in this Note. See infra
notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
9. Works that have been copyrighted before January 1, 1978, are subject to
termination of transfers. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988). The author, or other person so
entitled under the statute, has a five-year window of opportunity within which to
exercise the termination right, which vests fifty-six years after the date that copy-
right was secured. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). The right to terminate is limited by the
requirement of timely written notice. Notice of termination must be given at least
two and not more than ten years before the date of termination. 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(c)(4)(A).
As of the date of publication of this Note, the termination right has expired for
works copyrighted before December 31, 1932. If a work was copyrighted on Janu-
ary 1, 1933, the window during which the author would have the right to terminate
would begin on January 1, 1989 and end on December 31, 1994. Notice would
have to be given on or before December 31, 1992. See also notes 64-68 and ac-
companying text.
10. Id.
11. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF LAW
The copyright laws of the United States protect the interests of
authors and songwriters in their creative works." Prior to 1978, the
original term of copyright existed for twenty-eight years from the
date copyright was secured ("the First Term").1 3 At the end of the
First Term, the author 14 had an option to renew the copyright for an
additional twenty-eight years ("the Renewal Term").1 s After the ex-
piration of the total fifty-six years (the two 28-year terms), the copy-
righted material became part of the public domain.16
12. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing, for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." Prior to 1976, the primary source of United States copyright
law was the 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (previously
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216) (repealed 1976) [hereinafter the 1909 Act]. Begin-
ning in 1953, the Copyright Office undertook exhaustive review of the 1909 Act
culminating twenty-three years later in the completely revised 1976 Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)) (effective January 1, 1978) [hereinafter the 1976 Act]. For more informa-
tion concerning the development of the 1976 Act, see 1 ALEXANDE LumEY, LuWEY
oN Ew'n mmr, PusSHEO Am THm Aprs 4 (2d ed. 1990); Bruce A. Lehman, Leg-
islative Background, 25 Bms,. CornuoHr Soc'y U.S. 192 (1977).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976) (derived from section 23 of the
1909 Act).
14. For the purposes of this Note, unless otherwise specified, the terms "author"
and "writer" refer to the person or persons who owns or is entitled to the author's
termination interest. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
15. The renewal system was intended to serve a dual purpose. On one hand, the
author could allow the copyright to lapse after twenty-eight years if he felt protec-
tion was no longer needed. But on the other hand, and more importantly, the re-
newal system provided an author with a valuable second chance to profit from his
work:
If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years .... it should be the exclusive right of the author to take
the renewal term, and the law should be framed... so that he could not be
deprived of that right.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909); S. REP. No. 1108, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1909). See Frank R. Curtis, Protecting Authorsin Copyright Transfers:
Revision BilR § 203 and the Alternatives, 72 CoLuM. L. REv. 799, 805-06 (1972).
Critics argued that the renewal system failed to achieve this second purpose of
protecting authors because the 1909 Act did not provide for situations in which the
renewal term might be assigned in advance. See, e.g., Curtis, supra, at 806-09.
In 1943, the Supreme Court held that the renewal term was assignable in ad-
vance and that nothing in the 1909 Act prevented future assignments. Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). Thus, the author was able
to "enjoy a 'second chance' to profit from his work only if he [had] resisted publish-
ers' efforts to secure an advance assignment." Curtis, supra, at 807. Critics were
skeptical that such resistance to publishers' efforts to procure advance assignments
would be forthcoming from authors whose bargaining power was slight. Id.
16. Public domain is the public ownership status of works not protected by
copyrights. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990).
Public domain is the opposite of copyright .... It lacks the element of
1991]
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The writer is the initial owner of the copyright in a musical com-
position.17 In the music industry, however, the typical songwriter's
agreement requires the writer to transfer his ownership interest to
the publisher, making the publisher the copyright holder."8 In ex-
change, the writer usually receives an advance on royalties, the
benefit of the publisher's expertise, industry connections, adminis-
trative and promotional resources, and whatever other benefits for
which he may contract.1 9
Copyright law provides the copyright owner with certain rights.20
private property granted to copyright in that there is no restriction on
others from making full and complete use of the public domain material. It
is, literally, "free as the air."
SiDNEY SH~mm & M. Wuwim KRunovsxy, Tins Busimss or Music 266 (6th ed.
1990). See generally 1 Mm.vLE B. Nunmdn & DAvm Nunmm, Nnmiam oN CopviuoHr
§ 1.05[D] (1991) (discussing policy reasons for public domain).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
18. E.g., 2 Lmny, supra note 12, § 7.01. Songwriter's Agreement Form 7.01-1
paragraph 3(a):
Writer hereby assigns, transfers, sets over and grants to Publisher... each
and every right and interest of every kind... [in] all musical compositions
in any and all forms ... , together with all copyrights and renewals and
extensions thereof, which musical compositions have been written ... by
Writer... at any time prior to or during the term [of this agreement].
Id. The assignment of the copyright in a musical composition makes the assignee
the holder of the copyright in the composition. Richcar Music Co. v. Towns, 53
A.D.2d 501, 385 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Kupferman, J.), modified on other grounds and
afl'd, 67 A.D.2d 888, 413 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1976). See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 170
n.37 (listing sources cited for the proposition that in modem music industry most
copyrights are owned by publishers); see also Theodore R. Kupferman, Copyright
and Judges, 19 BuuL. Cop~inorr Soc'v U.S. 343, 351 (1972).
19. See generally Simmm & Kusuovscv, supra note 16, at 133-337 (discussing
in-depth the roles of music publishers and writers in today's music business).
20. The five fundamental rights ("bundle of rights") that the statute gives to
copyright owners are the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation (derivative
works), publication (distribution), performance, and display. Section 106 of the
1976 Act enumerates this bundle of rights:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the in-
dividual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106. The music industry practically always treats these rights as insep-
arable. Thus the music publisher alone, as copyright holder, administers the dis-
Perfozmance Royalties
These exclusive rights comprise the so called "bundle of rights" that
is a copyright. 21 The grant of an "exclusive" right means that the
copyright owner is the only party legally entitled "to do and to au-
thorize" any of the activities specified in the five numbered clauses
which comprise section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act ("the 1976
Act").2 2 Among these "activities" are the exclusive rights of repro-
duction, adaptation, and performance.23
RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION; COMPULSORY LICENSES;
MECHANICAL ROYALTIES
The right of reproduction refers to the copyright owner's exclu-
sive right "to reproduce a copyrighted work in copies or pho-
norecords." 24 A "phonorecord" is the actual material reproduction
of a sound recording-such as a tape cassette, phonograph record,
or compact disk-which eventually is distributed to the public.2"
The 1976 Act gives the copyright owner of "nondramatic musical
tinct rights of mechanical reproduction, print reproduction, preparation of
derivative works, and all other matters pertaining to publication. Summm &
KRsuovsxy, supra note 16, at 179. Nevertheless, the 1976 Act expressly recog-
nizes that a copyright is divisiblethat any one or more of the exclusive rights that
constitute a copyright may be separately owned and transferred. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d); see 17 U.S.C. § 101; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
22. Id.
23. For purposes of this Note, the right of distribution, § 106(3), is not at issue.
The right of display, § 106(5), does not pertain to sound recordings.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). The right of reproduction is also referred to as the right
of "mechanical reproduction." According to the legislative history of section 106,
the right of reproduction refers to the production of "material objects," which in the
context of the music industry would be phonograph records, tape cassettes, com-
pact discs, and so forth:
Read together with the relevant definitions in section 101, the right "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" means the
right to produce a material object in which the work is duplicated, tran-
scribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be "per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device.".... [A] copyrighted work would be in-
fringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial part, and by dupli-
cating it exactly or by imitation or simulation.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute defines phonorecords as "material objects in
which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the mate-
rial object in which the sounds are first fixed." Id.
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works"' 26 the exclusive right to be the first to "make and to distribute
phonorecords of such works" or to authorize another to do so.
27
Once the copyright owner exercises that right, however, the work is
subject to "compulsory licensing"; i.e., anyone may record and dis-
tribute phonorecords of the work provided he complies with certain
formalities. 28 In addition, the right of reproduction requires record
companies to make statutorily fixed payments to songwriters and
26. Nondramatic works such as musical compositions are distinguished from
dramatic works, which contain elements pertaining to drama or the theater such as
"plays, dramatic scripts designed for radio or television broadcast, pantomimes,
ballets, musical comedies, and operas." Swam & KRAswovsniy, supra note 16, at
214. Nondramatic performance rights (also called "small rights") are distinguished
from dramatic performance rights ("grand rights"). The copyright owner of a dra-
matic work has the exclusive right to perform the work publicly. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4). "Thus the copyright owner of the dramatic work My Fair Lady has the
absolute exclusive right to authorize or to withhold authorization of the recording or
performance in public of the musical play." Swam & Kwsnovsxv, supra note 16,
at 214. In contrast, a nondramatic work is subject to compulsory licensing, which
limits the copyright owner's "absolute exclusive" control over copyrighted nondra-
matic work. 17 U.S.C. § 115; see infra note 31 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally 1 NnamR, supra note 16, § 2.06[E)] (discussing distinction between a dramatic
work and a musical work).
The licensing of nondramatic public performance rights is handled by perform-
ing-rights organizations. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. ASCAP
ad-initers only nondramatic performance rights for its members. Swmm &
KRAsuwovsxy, supra note 16, at 215. BbI has only a limited right to license dramatic
performance. Id. at 215-16. SESAC generally excludes "grand rights" from its
contracts. Id. at 216.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
28. Id.; Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc. 233 F. Supp. 881, 882
(E.D. Pa. 1964); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-11 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5722-27. See generally 2 Nu am, supra
note 16, § 8.04 (section 115 compulsory license for the making of phonorecords);
Paul S. Rosenlund, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions for Pho-
norecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30 HAsvaos L.J. 683 (1979) (further
background information).
Section 115 of the 1976 Act covers the scope, availability, and formalities of
compulsory licensing:
When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed
to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright
owner, any other person may ... obtain a compulsory license to make and
distribute phonorecords of the work. A person may obtain a compulsory
license only if his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to
distribute them to the public for private use.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (emphasis added) (Compulsory license does not authorize the
distribution of phonorecords for commercial use, such as background music
services.).
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrange-
ment of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or man-
ner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement
shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work,
and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title,
except with the express consent of the copyright owner.
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publishers for the right to make and sell phonorecords. 29 These
payments generated from the sale of phonorecords are known as
mechanical royalties.3s
The Harry Fox Agency
For the most part, compulsory licensing and distribution of
mechanical royalties are handled by The Harry Fox Agency.3 1 The
Harry Fox Agency administers mechanical licenses on behalf of the
over 7800 publishers who use its services and oversees revenue col-
lection from record companies.3 2 The mechanical license requires
the manufacturer to account and pay for all phonorecords made and
distributed. Licensees have the same general rights and obligations
that users under the compulsory license provision (section 115) of
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
By guaranteeing certain rights to copyright owners, compulsory licensing was
intended to promote the spread of creative ideas, but critics maintain that it has the
opposite effect. OmcE OF TzcHOLoOY Asszssmcr., U.S. CoNuRESS, CopynoHr AND
HomE Copyo at 109 (1989) [hereinafter CopmoHr mw Homz Copmno]. According
to the Register of Copyrights, compulsory licensing is tough on copyright owners:
Once he exploits his right to record his music he is deprived of control
over further recordings. He cannot control their quality nor can he select
the persons who will make them. There have been many complaints of
inferior recordings and of recordings by financially irresponsible persons.
SHmcrd & KRsumovsxY, supra note 16, at 152-53 (quoting Register of Copyrights).
The record industry favors the compulsory license, while authors and publishers
have argued heatedly but unsuccessfully against it. Id. at 153.
29. CoPvuorr m HoMz Copymo, supra note 28, at 109.
30. The statutory royalty rate is determined by the length of the song, the
number of songs on the album, and net sales of the recording. The Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal sets mechanical royalty rates and adjusts the rate every two years
based on the Consumer Price Index. The statutory royalty rate as of January 1,
1990, is 5.7 cents for each record made and distributed or 1.1 cent per minute or
fraction thereof, which ever amount is greater. 37 C.F.R. § 307.3(e) (1990); NA-
T oNAL Music Pumasms' AssocIATioN, INc., THE HARRY Fox' Aonscv INc., 1990
BROcHURE 5 (1990) [hereinafter THE HARRY Fox AoEmcv BROCHURE]. The new statu-
tory royalty rate effective January 1, 1992, will be 6.25 cents for each record made
and distributed or 1.2 cent per minute or fraction thereof, which ever amount is
greater. [author], [title], B,,,.omnn, November 23, 1991, at 86. "Compulsory
mechanical license fees are seldom set at the statutory level, however. The user
can often negotiate a lower rate with the copyright owner." COPYROHT AND HOME
Copynwo, supra note 28, at 109-10 (footnotes omitted); THE HARRY Fox AoEmcr
BROCHURE, supra, at 5.
31. SHEmL & KRmovsxY, supra note 16, at 242-43. Compulsory licenses are
practically always issued with some variation from the requirements of section 115
of the 1976 Act. The compulsory license that varies in its terms from the statutory
requirements and is issued by The Harry Fox Agency is called a "mechanical li-
cense." In 1989, The Harry Fox Agency issued over 100,000 mechanical licenses
while less than 50 compulsory licenses were issued during the same period. Id. at
243.
32. THE HARRY Fox AoEmcY BRocHURE, supra note 30, at 4-5.
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the 1976 Act have.33
Right of Adaptation; Derivative Works; Sound Recordings
The right of adaptation is a shorthand phrase for the copyright
owner's exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work."' 4 A derivative work is "a work based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrange-
ment, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. ' s
Derivative works contain an element of creative authorship and may
be copyrighted independently of the underlying work.3"
A derivative work based on a musical composition is typically a
sound recording. Sound recordings are "works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other sounds, but not in-
cluding the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovi-
33. SHEMEL & Kmnsovsx , supra note 16, at 243.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). For example, an author may copyright a novel she has
written. A film producer may obtain a license and prepare a derivative work (a
motion picture) based on the novel. The film producer may now copyright the mo-
tion picture, independently of the novel, and will be entitled to the rights afforded
owners of copyrights in derivative works. Subsection 103(b) sets forth the scope of
protection for derivative works:
The copyright in a... derivative work extends only to the material contrib-
uted by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting ma-
terial employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence
of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
Id. It is "fundamental" that "copyrights in derivative works secure protection only
for the incremental additions of originality contributed by the authors of the deriva-
tive works." Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 907 (1989).
A derivative work may be prepared only with the permission of the owner of the
underlying work. Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 612
F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Drebin v. Russell, 446 U.S. 952
(1980). However, even an authorized derivative work must have sufficient ele-
ments of creative authorship to merit copyright protection. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("[To support a copyright there must
be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might
occur in the translation to a different medium."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976);
see Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982) (Even a work
having the "same aesthetic appeal" as an underlying work such as to constitute an
infringement if unauthorized, might incorporate "non-trivial contributions" to the
underlying work and thus be copyrightable if authorized.). On the other hand, a
work is not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from a prior copy-
righted work. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
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sual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.13
7
Typically, a sound recording is the particular musical arrangement
of the composition, including choice of instruments, vocalists,
tempo, and so forth, as fixed in a reproductive medium, such as a
master tape. Sound recordings are usually developed under
mechanical license, but may be copyrighted independently as de-
rivative works.3 8 The exclusive rights of the owner of the copyright
in a sound recording are limited to the rights of reproduction, adap-
tation, and distribution, and specifically exclude any right of per-
formance under section 106(4) of the 1976 Act.3 9
Right of Performance; Performance Royalties
The exclusive right of performance belongs solely to the copy-
right holder and provides that the holder is the only person with the
right to perform the work publicly.40 The copyright holder exer-
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
38. Independent copyright of the sound recording as a derivative work requires
the express permission of the owner of the underlying work and may not be ef-
fected under compulsory license. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 114. The owner of a sound recording does not enjoy the exclu-
sive right of performance. Anyone who obtains the phonorecord of a sound record-
ing may "publicly perform" (see infra notes 40-41 for a definition of publicly
perform), the sound recording without the permission of or any obligation to the
owner of the sound recording. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721-22. In effect, a radio station,
for example, "publicly performs" both the song and the sound recording every time
it plays a particular record over the air. Thus, two sets of ownership interests come
into play: the interest of the author and publisher in the underlying work (the song
itself), and the interest of the owner of the derivative work (the sound recording).
See I. Guum*A ERICKSON, EDWARD R. HELRN & MARK E. HALLORAN, MusiclN's GUIDE TO
Coi'mow'r 16 (rev. ed. 1983). Because the owner of the song has the exclusive
right of performance, the radio station must obtain a license which effectively
grants the owner's permission to publicly perform the song and orders payment of
performance fees. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(c). But because the owner of the sound
recording does not enjoy the exclusive right of performance, his permission is not
required nor must the station pay him performance royalties. See H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721-
22; 17 U.S.C. § 114(a), (b).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The legislative history of the 1976 Act clearly explains the
idea of "performance":
[T]he concepts of public performance.., cover not only the initial rendi-
tion or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or show-
ing is transmitted or communicated to the public. Thus, for example: a
singer is performing when he or she sings a song; a broadcasting network
is performing when it transmits his or her performance (whether simultane-
ously or from records); a local broadcaster is performing when it transmits
the network broadcast; a cable television system is performing when it re-
transmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is performing
whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or
communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set.
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cises his right to control public performance by granting licenses.
The licensing scheme generates performance royalties. 4
1
Performing Rights Societies
The copyright holder has the right to control the public perform-
ance of his copyrighted musical composition. Because it would be
impractical for individual owners to attempt to monitor all such per-
formances, organizations called performing rights societies were
created to account for royalties generated by performance. 42 A
performing rights society is "an association or corporation that
licenses the public performance of nondramatic musical works on
behalf of the copyright owners."' 43 A performing rights society
licenses the performance of the composition, collects a license fee
from users such as broadcasters, monitors the performance of the
composition, and distributes the appropriate royalties to the writer
and publisher.4 4
Th2e Copyright Act of 1976
In 1976 Congress substantially revised the copyright laws.45 One
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676-77.
41. Obviously, it would be impossible for every "performer" of a copyrighted
composition to contact the writer individually. Performance rights are granted by
license and are administered by large organizations called performing rights socie-
ties. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
42. Swmgxr & Kisxvsc, supra note 16, at 196-202; 2 NnzmmR, supra note 16,
§ 8.19; Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and
Performing Rights Societies, 33 Buu,. CoPrMowr Soc'y U.S. 332 (1986).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 116(e)(3). See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979). There are three performing rights organiza-
tions in the United States: American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), and Society of European Songwriters,
Authors and Composers ("SESAC").
44. A publisher and a songwriter each enter into separate agreements with a
performing rights society. These agreements authorize the performing rights soci-
ety to license nondramatic public performances of the composition. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Taylor, 10 Misc.2d 9, 55 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (holding
that the relationship between the writer, the publisher, and the performing rights
society is basically that of a "joint venture for the commercial exploitation of the
performing rights," 55 N.Y.S.2d at 102). The amount of the license fee paid by a
radio or television broadcaster is based on a percentage of net revenues earned by
the station. The money generated by license fees is distributed equally between
the writer and the publisher. Theoretically, the royalties distributed are determined
by the number of times the song is publicly performed. However, given how diffi-
cult it would be to monitor every performance on radio, television, and in live con-
certs, performing rights societies use an elaborate method of logging and statistical
sampling to determine the amount of royalties a given composition generates. See
sources cited supra note 42.
45. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Performance Royalties
of the objectives of the 1976 Copyright Act was to respond to cer-
tain inequities in the relationship between authors and publishers.46
In the typical pre-1978 scenario, the composer would bargain away
his ownership interest in the composition for the entire 56-year
copyright period.47 Unfortunately, due to the unequal bargaining
position between most composers and music publishers, certain
composers did not realize profits comparable to those of the music
publishers. Frequently, the composer was unable to predict his suc-
cess before his work was marketed. Thus, acquiescing to a dispro-
portionate distribution of profits, the composer would assign his
rights to a music publisher in exchange for the publisher's expertise.
In response to this unfair situation, Congress altered the law to favor
the composer's right to receive the compensation deserved for his
creative work.48
The 1976 Act specifically addresses three aspects of the relation-
ship between music publishers and composers. First, the legislation
provides for a longer duration of copyright protection. 49 Second, it
gives authors the right to terminate transfers and licenses so that
such grants do not govern the extended renewal term.s Third, the
termination causes all rights "covered by the terminated grant" to
revert to the author."1 The new statute gives the composer access to
his composition notwithstanding any prior agreements.
Duration of Copyright Protection
Under the 1976 Act, duration of copyright protection depends on
when the work was created or first copyrighted. Works that have
been copyrighted or published 2 fall into three categories: (1) new
works created on or after January 1, 1978; (2) copyrights in their
original term on January 1, 1978; and (3) copyrights in their re-
46. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740; Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 185-86
(1985) (White, J., dissenting).
47. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (The
1909 Copyright Act does not nullify an agreement by an author, made during the
original copyright term, to assign his renewal interest: an author may assign not
only the initial 28-year term of the copyright in his work, but also the renewal
term.). "Thus, assignees were able to demand the assignment of both terms at the
time when the value of the copyrighted work was most uncertain. The termination
provisions of the 1976 Act were designed to correct this situation." MiEls Music,
469 U.S. at 186 (White, J., dissenting).
48. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123-28, 139-42, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738-44, 5755-58.
49. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305; see infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c); see infra note 62-68 and accompanying text.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6); see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text; see
also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1985).
52. Pre-1978 works that are not published or copyrighted are protected by fed-
eral copyright for the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 303.
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newal term on January 1, 1978. The duration of copyright protec-
tion for new works created alter 1977 is the life of the author plus
fifty years.53 For works in their original term of copyright on Janu-
ary 1, 1978, copyright protection initially endures for twenty-eight
years from the date the copyright was secured.54 At the expiration
of the 28-year original term, subsection 304(a) provides a renewal
and extension term of forty-seven years."5 For works in their re-
newal term on January 1, 1978, copyright protection is extended to
endure for seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally
secured." Thus, upon expiration of the renewal term, subsection
304(b) provides an automatic 19-year renewal and extension of
copyright protection called the "Extended Renewal Term."
Renewal
"Mhe concept of copyright renewal applies only to pre-1978
works in their original term of copyright as of January 1, 1978."s T
To secure copyright renewal for such works, the applicant must
comply with a number of highly technical requirements.58 Renewal
rights belong to the author (or his assignee) if he is alive at the time
the original term expires.5 9 If the author dies before the expiration
of the original term, section 304 gives the renewal and extension
right to specified successors in a particular order of preference.60
The renewal copyright is independent of the first term and may be
53. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). In the case of a joint work, the duration of copyright is
fifty years after the death of the last surviving author. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b). For the
duration of copyright with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous works and
works made by an employee-for-hire, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).
57. SHamM & KRnssuovsxy, supra note 16, at 165; 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
58. See Copyright Office Regulation on Renewal of Copyright, 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.17 (1981) (reprinted in Sumnzm, & Knmuoovsx, supra note 16, at 470-72
app.); see SHxmim & KRAuovsKv, supra note 16, at 165-66. The Song Writers Guild
of America has a service which keeps track of copyrights and files applications for
its members at appropriate times. Id. at 166.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). Where there is more than one author, filing for renewal
by one of the collaborators is sufficient to protect the interests of all. Snmdm &
KvtuAovsKy, supra note 16, at 166. For certain works originally copyrighted by a
proprietor, the proprietor holds the renewal right. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1st proviso).
Such works include any posthumous work, or periodical, cyclopedic, or other com-
posite work, or work copyrighted by a corporation or employer which hired some-
one to create such work. Id.
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2d proviso). The order of preference is (1) the au-
thor, if still living; (2) if the author is dead, the widow(er) or children of the author;
(3) if no surviving widow(er) or child, the executor named in the author's will; (4) if
no surviving widow(er) or child, and the author died intestate, the deceased au-
thor's next of kin. 1d.
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assigned provided the author survives into the renewal year.6 1
Termination of Transfers and Licenses; Reversion
In the case of works existing in their original or renewal term on
January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act provides that upon expiration of the
term, the author 62 or his heirs6 3 may terminate 6 4 transfers or
licenses6s covering the extended renewal term.66 "Termination of
the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any fu-
hure grant."'6 7 Termination of the grant causes "all of a particular
author's rights ... that were covered by the terminated grant [to]
revert" to the author or his heirs.68
Derivative Works Exception
According to the statute, the author's reversion rights are subject
to the following limitation called the Derivative Works Exception
("the Exception"):
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the
grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the
preparation after the termination of other derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.69
The Exception protects the copyright owners of derivative works
from having to renegotiate agreements prepared under the original
grant. The public's right to have access to the derivative work is
61. See Stewart v. Abend, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1760 (1990).
62. "In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than the au-
thor, termination of the grant may be effected by the surviving person or persons
who executed it." 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1). If the grant is executed by more than one
author of the work, termination may be effected by such an author "to the extent of
a particular author's share in the ownership of the renewal copyright." Id.
63. If the author is dead, the termination interest is owned and may be exercised
by the surviving spouse and the author's children or grandchildren as provided in
subsection 304(c) clause (2). 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(A)-(C).
64. "Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five
years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally
secured, or beginning January 1, 1978, whichever is later." 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).
65. Termination right applies to both exclusive and nonexclusive transfers or
licenses other than by will. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6). The term "or his heirs" refers to that party which
owns that author's termination interest pursuant to subsection 304(c)(2). See supra
note 63. Where a grant is executed by an entity other than the author, termination
of the grant causes "all rights.., covered by the terminated grant [to] revert" to the
party who owns the termination interest pursuant to subsection 304(c)(1). 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(c)(6).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A).
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also protected, because absent the Exception, the owner of the re-
version rights (who now holds the exclusive right of adaptation)
could effectively block the use of the derivative work by refusing to
grant a license or by demanding terms that would render use of the
work unprofitable. The Exception also affects certain rights of music
publishers with respect to derivative works licensed prior to termi-
nation of transfer.
MILLS MUSIC, INC. v. SNYDER
The primary United States Supreme Court case interpreting the
Derivative Works Exception is Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder.70 In Mills
Music the Court held that a writer's termination of a publisher's in-
terest in a copyright does not vitiate the publisher's contractual right
to share in the mechanical royalties generated by derivative works
prepared before termination. Mils Music involved a dispute be-
tween a composer ("Snyder") and a publisher over royalties gener-
ated by sound recordings of the song "Who's Sorry Now" ("the
Song"). The heirs of the composer ("the Snyders"), exercising their
right under the 1976 Act,7 1 terminated a "grant" (assignment of
copyright) to the publisher, Mills Music, and reacquired the copy-
right in the Song. Prior to the termination, and pursuant to the grant
from Snyder to Mills Music, Mills had issued over 400 licenses to
record companies authorizing the use of the Song.72 Using a variety
of different settings, these record companies prepared separate de-
rivative works based on the original song.73 "Because each of these
derivative works was a mechanical reproduction of the Song that
was prepared pursuant to a license that Mills had issued, the record
companies were contractually obligated to pay royalties to Mills
"74
The Snyders claimed that termination of the grant divested Mills
Music of all further right to the mechanical royalties paid by the
record companies even though these royalties were generated by
the derivative works that Mills had authorized. The Snyders claimed
that because all rights revert to the author in this situation under the
1976 Act, the Snyders were entitled to al royalty payments gener-
ated after termination of the grant. Mills contended that the Deriva-
tive Works Exception protected its contractual right to receive
mechanical royalties for sound recordings of the Song which were
prepared under the original grant. The Court recognized that reso-
lution of the dispute hinged on scrutiny and interpretation of the lan-
70. 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2). See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
72. 469 U.S. at 158.
73. Id.
74. Id.
Performance Royalties
guage of the Derivative Works Exception,7 s
"Under the Terms of the Grant"
First, the Court determined that the word "grant" referred to the
original grant between Mills Music and Snyder.7 6 With respect to
the phrase "under the terms of the grant," however, the Court ob-
served that the word "grant" must refer both to the original grant
and to the specific terms of the licenses under which derivative
works were prepared. 77 The Court reasoned that because the "en-
tire set of documents" (i.e., the original assignment of copyright to
Mills Music plus the licenses that Mills granted to the record compa-
nies authorizing the preparation of derivative works) entitled Mills to
obtain a share of the royalty income, the Exception permitted Mills
to continue to collect royalty income after termination of the original
grant.
7 8
Ufilization
Second, the Court determined that the word "utilized" is defined
by the "terms of the grant" (i.e., the "total contractual relation-
ship").79 Thus, the total contractual relationship entitled Mills Music
to prepare "duly authorized derivative works" and to collect royal-
ties from record companies pursuant to the terms of their licenses.
75. 469 U.S. at 156. The Derivative Works Exception reads as follows:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termi-
nation may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work
covered by the terminated grant.
469 U.S. at 156 n.5 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A)).
76. Id. at 165.
77. Id. at 166-67.
78. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the rea-
soning of the Court of Appeals below, see 469 U.S. at 166-67 (quoting and re-
jecting Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd sub nor. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985)), which held that
the original grant from Snyder to Mills Music was entirely separate from the later
"grants" from Mills to the record companies and that the "terms of the grant" re-
ferred only to the subsequent "grants" to the record companies. The Court of Ap-
peals determined that after the Snyders terminated the original grant, the license
agreements between Mills Music and the record companies were all that remained.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Mills' authority to license the Song to
the record companies stemmed solely from the original grant from Snyder to Mills,
termination of the original grant left Mills without rights under the license agree-
ments, and the Snyders, to whom all rights had reverted, now stood in Mills' place.
Therefore, the record companies under the terms of the licenses were obligated to
pay the royalties to the Snyders. Harry Fox Agency, 720 F.2d at 738-39.
79. 469 U.S. at 169.
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Countervailing Purposes
Third, reading the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the Court
determined that although the principal purpose of the Act as a
whole was to provide added benefits to authors, the purpose of the
Exception specifically was to "preserve the right of the owner of
derivative work to exploit it, notwithstanding the reversion."8 °
Thus, the Court recognized two countervailing purposes in the 1976
Act: on one hand, to protect authors from bad bargains; but on the
other hand, to preserve the right of publishers (i.e., utilizers of deriv-
ative works) to enforce certain grants even though they were "mani-
festly unfair to the author."8" The Court reasoned that in order to
balance these countervailing purposes, consideration of two critical
factors would determine which purpose should control in a particu-
lar case: (1) the scope of the duly authorized grant, and (2) the date
the derivative work was prepared .8 2 In holding these factors con-
clusive, the Court rejected the argument that the position of the pub-
lisher as middleman did not merit protection because the publisher's
mere ownership interest was inferior to the interests of a party in-
volved on a creative level, such as an author or a record company.8 3
The Court was also unpersuaded by the policy argument that the
purpose of the Exception was to ensure public accessibility to deriv-
ative works after the exercise of an author's termination rights.8 4
Applying the above two-factor test,85 the Mills Music Court held
for the publisher, Mills, because (1) the derivative works in question
were prepared before the Snyders' termination, and (2) the total
contractual relationship between the parties entitled Mills to a share
in the royalties.
Criticism of Mills Music
Criticism of Mills Music began within the Court itself; Mills Music
was a 5-4 decision with a vigorous dissent. Members of Congress
were unhappy with the result as well. Immediately after the deci-
80. Id. at 173 (quoting Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draftfor Revised U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Revision Part 4
(H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964), at 39 (statement of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 174.
83. Id. at 175-76 ("[W~e are in no position to evaluate the function that each
music publisher actually performs in the marketing of each copyrighted song." Id.
at 175.).
84. Id. at 176-78. The gist of the argument is that "[wjithout the Exception, the
reversion that an author's termination effected would have given the author the
power to prevent further utilization of [derivative works], or possibly to demand
royalties that [utilizers] were unwilling to pay," and thereby inducing the utilizers to
take the derivative work off the market. Id. at 177.
85. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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sion, bills were proposed in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate to legislatively overrule Mills Music.86 Senator Specter
attempted to clarify Congressional intent:
The exception was intended to protect the actual owners of deriv-
ative works from having to renegotiate rights in underlying works,
when an author exercised termination rights with regard to the
underlying work .... The benefit should go to the authors, who
were the intended beneficiaries, in general, of the entire termina-
tion scheme. The Court's decision in Mills Music seriously under-
cuts what Congress intended and deprives authors of benefits that
are rightfully theirs.8 7
Although up to now these bills have not been enacted into law, they
nevertheless demonstrate Congressional disapproval of the interpre-
tation of the Derivative Works Exception in Mills Music. Commenta-
tors have been critical of the decision as well.88
DISCUSSION
Once the author8 9 exercises his termination right, the 1976 Act
explicitly provides that "all rights under [the 1976 Act] that were
covered by the terminated grant revert" to the author.90 Thus, when
a writer terminates the grant to a publisher of the exclusive right of
performance, that right of performance reverts to the writer and may
86. See H.R. 3163, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1384, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
87. Copyright Act's "Derivative Works Exception" Is Subject of Hearing, 31
PAT. TRADmmm & CopmazHT J. (BNA) 82 (November 28, 1985). Senator Specter
would legislatively overrule the Mills Music decision by adding the following sub-
section to § 304(c):
(7). Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where an author or his
successor. ... has exercised a right of termination pursuant to this section
and a derivative work continues to be utilized pursuant to subsection
(c)(6)(A) of this section, any right to royalties from the utilization of the
derivative work shall revert to the person exercising the termination right.
Id.
88. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the
Derivative Works Exception, 62 U. DEr. L. REv. 181, 238 (1985) (Mills Music
places "language of a statute at war with itself and with its underlying purposes");
Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CoRE., L.
REv. 857, 901-03 (1987) (decisions such as Mils Music create threat of systematic
distortion of 1976 Act); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termi-
nation of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 Ono ST. L.J. 897
(1987). The Former Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, who actually wrote the
derivative works exception section, indicated that the Court's decision is "just dead
wrong." Copyright Act's "Derivative Works Exception" Is Subject of Hearing, 31
PAT. TRADEmARK & COPYMRGHT J. (BNA) 81, 82 (November 28, 1985).
89. See supra note 63. Unless otherwise specified, the term "author" will refer
to the person or persons who owns or is entitled to the author's termination interest.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6); see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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be reassigned to another publisher.91 In general, the reversion di-
vests the terminated publisher of all the rights covered by the grant.
As a result, royalties generated by subsequent public performance
of the composition accrue to the holder of the reversion, whether it
be the author or his assignee.92 The general reversion is limited
however by the Derivative Works Exception.93 Given such general
reversion, a claim that the terminated copyright holder of the under-
lying work retains the right to royalties generated by the public per-
formance of pre-termination sound recordings licensed as derivative
works can be maintained only by operation of the Derivative Works
Exception. Assuming that the Exception does apply in such a situa-
tion, the question becomes whether the publisher-owner's collecting
of performance royalties constitutes utilization of the derivative
work. According to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Ex-
ception in Mil Music, the answer appears to be yes.94
91. Subject of course to the law governing assignments. See H.R. IE. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 128, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5743; see
generally JozN D. CuAwvuAm & JosEPH M. Piuso, Cornncus § 18 (3d ed. 1987).
92. Even where the writer has assigned his ownership interest to a publisher,
performing rights societies distribute performance royalties equally between the
writer and the publisher: writer's royalties to the writer and publisher's royalties to
the publisher. See supra note 44. Therefore, as a practical matter, any reversion or
reassignment of the performance right only affects the publisher royalties; the
writer royalties accrue to the writer regardless of to whom he assigns the perform-
ance right.
93. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
94. A straightforward application of the Court's rationale in Mills Music seems
to indicate that a terminated publisher retains the right to performance royalties as
a utilizer of a derivative work. The Court's interpretation of the Exception identi-
fied two critical factors to be applied to determine a terminated copyright owner's
rights: (1) the scope of the duly authorized grant, and (2) the date that the deriva-
tive work was prepared. First, a typical songwriter contract refers to or is subject to
independent agreements between the Writer, the Publisher and a Performing
Rights Society regarding performance royalties; therefore, the Publisher's right to
performance royalties is within the scope of the grant. Second, the performance
royalties demanded are generated by derivative works prepared by the Publisher
before termination. Thus the Publisher retains the right to performance royalties
generated by the derivative works prepared before termination.
The counter-argument is that Mills Music concerned the distribution of mechani-
cal royalties paid by a record companynot the distribution of performance royalties
paid by a performing rights society. The Court wanted to preserve the long-term,
existing contracts between the publisher and record companies. Its unstated ration-
ale was that since the statute preserves the rights of the tranferee (record company)
the Court should stretch the language of the statute to preserve the rights of the
transferor (publisher) as well. Under this view, to stretch the statute's language
even further to preserve the short-term performance licenses, which are issued on a
prospective basis, is unwarranted. This view advocates a narrow reading of the
Court's holding: The interpretation of the Exception with respect to the right of
reproduction (distribution of mechanical royalties) cannot apply to an interpreta-
tion of the statute with respect to the right of performance (distribution of perform-
ance royalties). Under a narrow reading of Mills Music, the only form of utilization
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First, the Mils Music Court indicated that the "terms of the grant"
refer to both the "original grant" between the author and publisher
and the subsequent grants from the publisher to the record compa-
nies.'9 The "original grant" is the songwriter contract that contains
the writer's assignment of copyright to a music publisher. Such con-
tracts practically always provide, or incorporate existing agree-
ments, for the distribution of performance royalties through
affiliation with a performing rights organization.96 Thus the "origi-
nal grant" includes the performance royalty distribution agreement,
which names the publisher as a distributee. Second, the Court held
that Mills Music "utilized" the derivative works it had licensed the
record companies to prepare.97  As utilizer, Mills Music was enti-
tled to those rights that escape reversion to the author: "The 'terms
of the grant' as existing at the time of termination govern the au-
thor's right to receive royalties; those terms are therefore excluded
from the bundle of rights that [revert to the author]."98 Because the
grant entitled the publisher to performance royalties before its ter-
mination, a rational reading suggests that the publisher may con-
tinue to collect performance royalties after its termination.9 9
A flaw in this reasoning is that it ignores the fact that ownership
rights in sound recordings exclude the right of performance.10 0
When a sound recording is prepared as a derivative work, copyright
law gives the owner of the sound recording the exclusive rights of
reproduction, adaptation, and distribution only, and specifically ex-
that terminated copyright owners may continue to exercise is the right to collect
mechanical royalties from record companies for the pre-termination derivative
works. According to the narrow-reading view, the Court's reasoning that "utiliza-
tion" is defined by the total contractual relationship must be understood in light of
the Mills Music factual setting, which concerned only the right to mechanical royal-
ties. Furthermore, the subsequent legislative history indicates that the purpose of
the Exception was to protect the creative parties involved and should not be ex-
panded to include protection of non-creative middlemen. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
95. MilMs Music, 469 U.S. at 165-67.
96. See, e.g., Songwriter Contract Form of The Songwriters Guild of America f1
2 (reprinted in SHEmm & KRnsLovsxy, supra note 16, at 612 app.):
2. In all respects this contract shall be subject to any existing agreements
between the parties hereto and the following small performing rights li-
censing organization with which Writer and Publisher are affiliated: (AS-
CAP, BMI, SESAC). Nothing contained herein shall, or shall be deemed
to, alter, vary or modify the rights of Writer and Publisher to share in, re-
ceive and retain the proceeds distributed to them by such small perform-
ing rights licensing organization pursuant to their respective agreement
with it.
97. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 169.
98. Id. at 174.
99. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A).
100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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cludes the right of performance. 1 1 With respect to a sound record-
ing, no amount of utilization will ever generate performance
royalties for its owner. The publisher's right to performance income
stems not from his status with respect to the sound recording, but
solely from his status as owner of the underlying work. 10 2
Of central importance is the distinction between the rights that
attach to the Song-the underlying work-and those that attach to
the sound recording-the derivative work. In essence, there are two
sets of ownership interests involved: the Song-owner's interest and
the Sound Recording-owner's interest.1' The Song-owner is typi-
cally the publisher; the Sound Recording-owner is the record com-
pany. The Sound Recording-owner's (record company's) utilization
of the sound recording basically consists of reproduction and distri-
bution, i.e., sales. The money that the Sound Recording-owner
makes is from the sale of reproductions of the sound recording.
The Song-owner (publisher) has rights in the sound recording as
well. The Song-owner's rights in the sound recording stem from the
fact that the Sound Recording-owner (the record company) may not,
record the song (i.e., prepare a derivative work) without obtaining a
license to do so. This license, called a mechanical license, autho-
rizes the record company to prepare the sound recording. The
Song-owner's rights in the sound recording are determined by the
terms of that mechanical license. The Song-owner makes money
from the sale of the sound recording because the mechanical li-
cense provides the Song-owner with a percentage of the revenue
generated by the sale of reproductions of the sound recording
(mechanical royalties).
The question in Mills Music was whether this collecting of
mechanical royalties by the Song-owner/publisher constituted "util-
ization" of the derivative work, so as to bring the publisher's right to
the mechanical royalties within the Derivative Works Exception.
According to the Mills Music decision, the Song-owner's mechani-
cal licensing of the song qualifies him as a utilizer of the sound re-
cording. Such a qualification seems illogical because the right to
grant mechanical licenses derives from ownership of the song, not
from ownership of the sound recording. What the Song-owner is
utilizing under mechanical license is the song, not the sound record-
ing. Nevertheless, under Mills Music, the Song-owner is a utilizer of
the sound recording; his right to mechanical royalties therefore con-
tinues under the Derivative Works Exception.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a); see supra note 39.
102. The publisher's authority to license the preparation of derivative works
stems from the publisher's status as owner of the underlying work as well. Calling
the publisher's exercise of this right "utilization" of the derivative work is illogical.
But this is what the Supreme Court held in Mi!/s Musicit's the law.
103. See supra note 39.
Performance Royalties
The effect of the above is that both the Song-owner/publisher and
the Sound Recording-owner/record company are utilizers of the
particular sound recording. The Song-owner's rights as utilizer of a
sound recording, however, are necessarily limited to the rights that
attach to copyright ownership of the sound recording. The Song-
owner cannot have greater rights in the sound recording than does
the Sound Recording-owner. Because the Sound Recording-owner
has no right to performance royalties as utilizer of the sound record-
ing, neither can the Song-owner as utilizer of the sound
recording. 10
4
The Song-owner does have an exclusive right that goes beyond
those held by the Sound recording-owner, but this right stems solely
from ownership of the Song and in no way from utilization of the
sound recording. Because it is the utilization of a derivative work
that is protected from reversion by the Derivative Works Exception,
and because the performance right attaches not to the utilizer or
owner of a sound recording but to the Song-owner, the performance
right is not protected by the Exception and is among the rights that
revert to the author upon termination. Thus, the terminated copy-
right holder of an original Song loses the right to continue to collect
performance royalties generated by pre-termination sound record-
ings that were licensed by the terminated owner and prepared while
the terminated owner held the copyright.
This conclusion is consistent with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC pol-
icy, which upon reversion or assignment, simply substitutes the new
copyright owner and pays him all the performance income gener-
ated by the Song regardless of when, or by whom, particular sound
recordings were prepared.'0 s Most songwriter contracts contain
provisions that explicitly require parties to abide by performing
rights societies' guidelines.1 0 6
104. There is nevertheless a strong argument against segregation of the rights
that flow from the sound recording from those that flow from the underlying work.
Public broadcast of a sound recording generates performance income because the
underlying work is being publicly performed. But the sound recording is also be-
ing publicly performed, and this is undoubtedly a form of utilization of the sound
recording. It cannot be ignored that utilization of the sound recording by public
performance necessarily coincides with public performance of the underlying
work. On can argue that because this kind of utilization of the sound recording
before termination generated performance income for the owner of the underlying
work, continued public performance of the sound recording after termination
should continue to generate royalties for the party who "under the terms of the
grant" was owner of the underlying work when the derivative work was prepared.
105. This Note does not address the considerable practical difficulties that would
stem from the performing rights organization having to determine which sound re-
cording of the song is being performed and to distribute the performance royalties
generated by individual songs to more than one publisher.
106. See supra note 96. On the other hand, performing rights societies enter sep-
arate agreements with the writer and publisher. Royalties are paid to the publisher
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CONCLUSION
Once a writer exercises his statutory right of termination, the ex-
clusive right of performance reverts to the writer. A terminated
copyright owner does not retain the right to performance royalties
generated by pre-termination sound recordings because it is owner-
ship of the underlying work, and not utilization of the sound record-
ing, that entitles one to performance royalties. Copyright ownership
of a sound recording excludes the right of performance. Although
the terminated copyright holder may continue to utilize the sound
recording under the terms of the grant after termination, the utiliza-
tion simply does not include the right to performance royalties.
Therefore, termination of the grant divests a publisher of the right to
performance royalties. Performance rights should revert to the
writer or his successor regardless of prior utilizations by the pub-
lisher and notwithstanding the contrary result implied by the
Supreme Court's decision in Mills Music.
Joseph Hubicki**
independently from those paid to the writer. The publisher may argue that when
the writer terminated the original grant between the writer and publisher, the
agreement between the publisher and the performing rights society was unaffected
because no privity existed between the writer and the society regarding the agree-
ment between publisher and the society. Without privity the writer had no legal
right to terminate the agreement between the publisher and the society; nor did the
writer have the right to designate another publisher as the party to whom the per-
formance income must be paid. The performance royalties should be paid to the
publisher under its separate and independent agreement with the Performing
Rights Society, which neither the writer nor his heirs had the right to terminate.
When the writer and publisher entered into their original agreement, however, they
agreed to follow a Performing Rights Society's system of distribution of royalties.
The known practice of a Performing Rights Society was to substitute the new as-
signee for any terminated copyright owner. Therefore, the author or his assignee,
as current copyright owner, is entitled to receive all a Performing Rights Society
royalties.
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